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I. INTRODUCTION 
“That Men ought to speak well of their Governours is true, while their 
Governours deserve to be well spoken of; but to do public Mischief, 
without hearing of it, is only the Prerogative and Felicity of Tyranny: A 
free People will be shewing that they are so, by their Freedom of 
Speech. 
The Administration of Government, is nothing else but the Attendance 
of the Trustees of the People upon the Interest and Affairs of the 
People: And as it is the Part and Business of the People, for whose 
Sake alone all public Matters are, or ought to be transacted, to see 
whether they be well or ill transacted; so it is the Interest, and ought to 
be the Ambition, of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds openly 
examined, and publicly scann’d.” 
Thomas Gordon, Silence Dogood No. 81 
On April 4, 2015, Officer Michael Slager, a white man, pulled over 
Walter Scott, a black man, for a broken brake light.2  Scott ran from the 
vehicle and Officer Slager pursued.3  At some point during the chase, 
Scott and Slager struggled and Scott broke free.4  As Scott ran away, 
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 1.    ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thomas Gordon, 
Silence Dogood No. 8, The New–England Courant (Boston), July 9, 1722, reprinted in 1 The Papers 
of Benjamin Franklin 28 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., 1959)). 
 2.   Catherine E. Shoichet, Video Could Be Key as Ex-Cop Goes on Trial in Walter Scott 
Killing, CNN (Oct. 31, 2016, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/31/us/michael-slager-trial-
north-charleston/. 
 3.   Michael Martinez, South Carolina Cop Shoots Unarmed Man: A Timeline, CNN (Apr. 9, 
2015, 10:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-cop-shoots-black-man-
timeline/. 
 4.   Id. 
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Slager shot Scott four times in the back.5  Immediately following the 
shooting, Slager claimed the two had struggled over his Taser.  Slager 
said Scott had attempted to use the Taser on him, and he had resorted to 
his gun.6  The police department recounted Slager’s version of events to 
the public.7  But then a bystander with a video came forward.8  Feidin 
Santana had captured the struggle, the shooting, and the immediate 
aftermath on his cell phone as he walked to work.9  The video showed 
Officer Slager was not in danger when he fired his gun—instead, Slager 
fatally shot Scott as he ran away.10  The video went viral.11  When 
presented with the video evidence, officials changed course and charged 
Slager with murder.12  Without the video it is unlikely that Slager’s 
superiors or the public would have learned the truth and therefore it is 
unlikely that Slager would have been charged. 
This and other police shootings caught on video have sparked a 
national conversation about police procedures, particularly procedures 
related to race and the use of force.  As more people attempt to record the 
police, questions arise about whether the public has a right to 
videorecord on-duty police officers. 
Most of the courts presented with the question have found that the 
First Amendment protects the public’s right to videorecord police.13  The 
First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have now found in favor of First 
Amendment protection.14  Many more courts are likely to address this 
question in the future.  This Comment examines the various ways courts 
                                                          
 5.   Id. 
 6.   Michael E. Miller, Lindsey Bever, and Sarah Kaplan, How a Cellphone Video Led to 
Murder Charges Against a Cop in North Charleston, S.C., WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/08/how-a-cell-phone-video-led-
to-murder-charges-against-a-cop-in-north-charleston-s-c/. 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   Id. 
 9.   Harriet McLeod, Reuters, Jury Watches Cell Phone Video in the Case of a White South 
Carolina Officer Who Shot a Black Man, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2016, 6:39 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/jury-watches-cell-phone-video-in-the-case-of-a-white-south-
carolina-officer-who-shot-a-black-man-2016-11. 
 10.   Alan Blinder, Mistrial for South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter Scott, (Dec. 5, 2016), 
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-scott-michael-slager-north-
charleston.html?_r=0. 
 11.   Id.  
 12.   Miller et al., supra note 6.  The first trial ended in a mistrial, with prosecutors saying they 
intended to try Slager again.  Blinder, supra note 10. 
 13.   See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 
F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 14.   Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 
848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017); Glik, 655 F.3d at 78; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332. 
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have analyzed whether the First Amendment protects citizens who 
videorecord police and proposes a framework that would provide greater 
stability in this area of law. 
Most courts faced with this issue have focused on whether the person 
videorecording was engaged in an activity that was an exercise of 
freedom of speech.15  Though videographers are not literally speaking, 
courts have found that they may qualify for First Amendment protection 
when recording police.  This may be true either because videographers 
are gathering information as an antecedent to speech or because they are 
engaged in expressive conduct.16  With these two types of protected 
speech in mind, courts condition First Amendment protection on finding 
facts that indicate the activity was an antecedent to speech or expressive 
conduct.  This approach is reasonable in theory, but in practice it fosters 
viewpoint discrimination and provides journalists with more protection 
than the public. 
When police object to or interfere with videorecoding by journalists, 
courts tend to grant journalists protection under the Press Clause17 of the 
First Amendment.  However, when police object to or interfere with 
videorecoding by citizens, courts apply various Speech Clause18 
approaches, which produce inconsistent and confusing results.  This 
Comment argues that courts should correct the disparity between 
journalists and citizens by adopting a rebuttable presumption that citizens 
intend to publish video they take of police. 
Courts analyzing this issue should consider the original purpose of 
the First Amendment, Supreme Court precedent, and the public interest.  
The original purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the forum 
for discussion of issues in the public interest.19  This protection applied to 
anyone who used the printing press to publish her thoughts and ideas.20  
Courts typically presume journalists intend to gather news and publish in 
the public interest.  When deciding whether a citizen’s expressive 
freedom is protected, on the other hand, courts do not assume an intent to 
                                                          
 15.   See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012); Fields v. City of 
Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 533–34 (E.D. Pa. 2016), rev’d, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Pluma v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ.2017(LAP), 2015 WL 1623828, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 16.   See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595–96; Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. 
Supp. 2d 504, 512–13, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 17.   See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
 18.   See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
 19.   See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597. 
 20.   Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? 
From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (2012). 
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publish and therefore some courts limit protection.  This disparity is 
counter to extensive precedent holding that the press does not enjoy 
greater rights under the First Amendment than average citizens.21  When 
courts fail to consider the original purpose of the Press and Speech 
Clauses they contribute to this disparity.22  Shifting the analysis to 
provide a limited rebuttable presumption that citizens who videorecord 
police intend to publish or speak would solve these problems. 
This Comment begins in Part II with discussion of the original 
purpose and meaning of “freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech,” 
as well as the tests that have developed under each clause and how those 
tests have been applied to the analysis of First Amendment protection for 
citizens videorecording police.  Particular emphasis is given to the 
differences in the way the press and the public are treated.  Part III 
argues that not only are speech and expressive conduct analyses ill-suited 
to the act of citizens videorecording police, applying these analyses 
causes courts to treat journalists more favorably than the public in 
contradiction of Supreme Court precedent.  Finally, Part IV concludes 
with a summary of the approaches to analyzing protection for citizens 
who videorecord police and an argument for a presumption that citizens 
who videorecord police intend to publish the video. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment was added to the United States Constitution in 
1791.23  Much has changed in the last 226 years.  The understanding of 
the words “speech” and “press” have evolved.  Major advancements in 
technology have been made.  And, a number of tests for protected speech 
and press rights have been developed.  Courts have often struggled to 
connect those tests to changes in technology.  Though new technology 
does raise new challenges, considering the original purpose and meaning 
of the First Amendment remains vital to the proper analysis of these 
rights, particularly the public’s right to videorecord police. 
                                                          
 21.   See discussion infra Section III.D.3. 
 22.   See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 23.   N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
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A.  Freedom of Speech 
1. Original Purpose and Meaning 
The First Amendment protects the forum for discussion of ideas in 
the public interest.24  The Speech Clause originally meant that the First 
Amendment protected the right to literal in-person speech.25  Though the 
acts of writing or publishing ideas are often understood to be speech 
today, speech did not inherently include those activities at the drafting of 
the Constitution.26  Early writers referred to speech literally and to the 
press as a vehicle of speech.27  Today, the ordinary understanding of 
freedom of speech has come to include a wide variety of freedoms of 
expression, including some expression that could be called publishing, 
such as sharing videos and posting opinions online.28 
2. When is There Protection for Speech 
The Speech Clause protects speech itself (pure speech), conduct that 
precedes and is intertwined with pure speech (antecedents to speech),29 
and conduct that is itself expressive (expressive conduct).30  These 
varying types of protected speech reflect the fact that “[c]ontrol[ing] or 
suppress[ing] speech may operate at different points in the speech 
process.”31 
Pure speech includes: speaking, writing, music, dancing, painting, 
and tattooing among others.32  Because all of these actions are 
“inherently expressive,” they need not include a message in order to be 
                                                          
 24.   See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597 
 25.   Volokh, supra note 20, at 475. 
 26.   Id. at 476. 
 27.   Id. 
 28.   Id. at 477. 
 29.   David Murphy, Comment, “V.I.P.” Videographer Intimidation Protection: How the 
Government Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape the Police, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 324 
(2013) (“[T]he Press Clause is interpreted to protect reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, 
such as legitimate means of news gathering.”). 
 30.   Ira P. Robbins, What Is the Meaning of “Like”?: The First Amendment Implications of 
Social-Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 127, 133 (2013) (“[F]or example, the Supreme Court 
held that wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War was symbolic speech protected by the 
First Amendment.”). 
 31.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
 32.   See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); Murphy, supra note 
29, at 324. 
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protected.33  If a message were required, “constitutional protection . . . 
would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll.”34 
Antecedents to speech include conduct preceding speech that is so 
“intertwined” with speech itself, it is protected alongside speech.35  The 
law does not, “disconnect the end product from the act of creation.”36  
For example, writing is protected as an antecedent to publishing an essay 
and the act of tattooing is protected as an antecedent to the expression in 
the finished tattoo.37 
Expressive conduct, or symbolic speech, refers to the freedom to 
express one’s thoughts through conduct.  The test for conduct to be 
expressive or symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment is: (1) 
“an intent to convey a particularized message,” and (2) “that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”38  Examples of expressive 
conduct include: “picketing, armband-wearing, flag-waving and flag-
burning.”39  The government is allowed more leeway to restrict 
expressive conduct than to restrict pure speech.40 
B. Freedom of the Press 
1. Original Purpose and Meaning 
Most scholars agree that the First Amendment protection for freedom 
of the press was intended to protect the ability of citizens to share 
information in the public interest.41  The press has sometimes been called 
the fourth branch or an additional check on the powers of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government.42  Today, information in 
                                                          
 33.   See, e.g., Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring); 
Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the 
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 372–73 (2011) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 790 (1989)). 
 34.   Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 35.   Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062; Murphy, supra note 29, at 324. 
 36.   Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061–62. 
 37.   See supra notes 31–32. 
 38.   See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 39.   Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)), rev’d, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 40.   Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
 41.   ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754 (2011)).  
 42.   See Roy S. Gutterman, Note, Chilled Bananas: Why Newsgathering Demands More First 
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the public interest can be shared not just through newspapers but through 
television, radio, blogs, forums, and social media.  This means that 
average citizens may “check” the government the same way newspapers 
long have. 
But even early Americans did not rely solely on newspapers for their 
information.  Early Americans shared information through leaflets and 
pamphlets, including the anonymously authored Federalist Papers.43  The 
Constitution protected all who used the printing press to disseminate 
their ideas and information, not just the news organizations that society 
now knows as “the press.”44 
“The press” did not always mean an industry of professional 
journalists.  Near the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the “press” 
was defined in dictionaries as the machine called the printing press.45  
Not until 1828, did Noah Webster’s dictionary define “press” as both the 
machine and the industry.46  Webster defined the “liberty of the press” as 
“the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his 
thoughts and opinions . . . .”47  The freedom of the press, therefore, 
protected the right of any citizen to use the machine to disseminate 
ideas.48 
In those early years of the country, the meaning of the words “press” 
and “speech” did not overlap.  The freedom of the press was meant to 
specifically protect the freedom to print and publish, while the freedom 
of speech protected the freedom to literally speak.49  This separate 
protection for the press was important because some governments prior 
to the founding of the United States had specifically attempted to restrict 
the use of the printing press.50 
In the decades after the ratification of the Constitution, state supreme 
courts recognized the freedom of the press as the right of every citizen to 
publish his or her ideas.51  Professor Eugene Volokh’s survey of fifteen 
                                                          
Amendment Protection, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197, 203 (2000) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 240 (1926)). 
 43.   Kristine L. Dietz, Comment, Citizen Journalists & the Right to Gather News: Why 
Maryland Needs to Acknowledge a First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 
135, 145–46 (2014). 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Volokh, supra note 20, at 483–84. 
 46.   Id. at 483–484, 467 n.24 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828) (under “press”)). 
 47.   Id. 
 48.   See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446–48 (2002). 
 49.   Volokh, supra note 20, at 464, 475. 
 50.   Id. at 476. 
 51.   Id. at 466 (citing Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788)). 
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cases from 1784 to 1840 shows that the freedom of the press was used in 
legal arguments to protect not just journalists but the general public.52  
Early cases and opinions noted that the press was not afforded extra 
protection beyond that afforded to the general public, which suggests that 
the right was not attached to the industrialized press, but to publishing in 
general.53  Those judges viewed the combination of the Press and Speech 
Clauses as the equivalent of state constitutional provisions protecting the 
right of every citizen to “freely speak, write, and publish his 
sentiments.”54  The concept of the press as professional journalists and 
publishers did not develop in the courts until the 1970s.55  Modern 
justices have also acknowledged that the freedom of the press refers to 
the freedom of every person to publish ideas.56 
2. When is There Protection for the “Press”? 
Freedom of the press encompasses freedom to publish as well as 
freedom to gather information to publish.57  Numerous courts and 
scholars have recognized that the right to gather information is essential 
to the freedom of the press.58  More than 40 years ago the Supreme Court 
somewhat ambiguously stated that “news gathering [sic] is not without 
its First Amendment protections.”59  Without protection for gathering 
information, the press could be prevented from functioning.  Although 
the Supreme Court may have been ambiguous on this point, the rationale 
underlying the protection of newsgathering is not only clear, it is 
imperative.  Without information, journalists cannot publish information 
in the public interest.60  If government were permitted to limit “the stock 
                                                          
 52.   Id. at 483–498. 
 53.   Id. at 498, 504 (citing Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827)). 
 54.   Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted). 
 55.   Id. at 464–65. 
 56.   Id. at 462; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 390 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“It is passing strange to interpret the phrase ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press’ to mean, not 
everyone’s right to speak or publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak or the institutional press’s 
right to publish.  No one thought that is what it meant.”).  See also discussion infra Section III.C. 
 57.   See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1978) (“There is an undoubted right to 
gather news ‘from any source by means within the law.’” (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 681–82 (1972))). 
 58.   Id. at 11; First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, reh’g denied, 438 U.S. 
907 (1978); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 
F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2011); CNN v. ABC, 
518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Kreimer, supra note 33, at 383–84. 
 59.   Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
 60.   Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
2017 THE PUBLIC’S EVOLUTIONS 157 
of information from which members of the public may draw,”61 the 
“rights to publish, inform and exchange ideas would be moot.”62  Access 
to information allows the discussion to occur.63  Though the contours of 
this right to gather news have not been distilled to a simple test, it is an 
acknowledged right—government may not restrain publication by 
restraining newsgathering. 
Even for the press, however, the right to gather news has limits.  The 
Supreme Court has refused to read the First Amendment to provide 
protections to the press that exceed those provided to the public.64  In 
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court refused to acknowledge a journalist’s 
privilege that would have protected journalists from being forced to 
reveal confidential sources.65  In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court held 
that the news media did not have a constitutional right to access a county 
jail.66  In Pell v. Procunier, the Court held that journalists had no 
constitutional right to interview prison inmates.67  In addition, members 
of the press are not immune from civil or criminal liability for 
newsgathering activities.68  These refusals to grant privileges to the press 
are based on the principle that journalists do not have a greater right of 
access to information than the general public.69  Rather, the freedom of 
the press protects every person’s right to publish and the right to gather 
news by means available to the public.70 
C.  Analysis of Citizens Who Videotape Police 
The most important question for the application of the First 
Amendment to citizens who videorecord police is often which test 
                                                          
 61.   Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.  
 62.   Gutterman, supra note 42, at 208. 
 63.   Id. 
 64.   Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725–27 
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 65.   408 U.S. at 708–09.  Nevertheless, lower courts have read Justice Powell’s concurrence 
and Justice Stewart’s dissent together to hold that journalists have a qualified privilege.  See 
Branzburg v. Hayes, Reporters’ Privilege & Circuit Courts, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (July 12, 2005), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/branzburg-v-hayes-reporters%E2%80%99-privilege-circuit-
courts/ (“Despite what seems to be a ruling that no reporters’ privilege exists, most of the circuit 
courts have acknowledged a qualified privilege. There is little agreement on the extent of the 
privilege, however.”). 
 66.   438 U.S. at 15–16. 
 67.   Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834–35 (1974). 
 68.   Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding 
Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2000). 
 69.   Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16; Pell, 417 U.S. at 833–34; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–85. 
 70.   Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9–11 (1978). 
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applies.  If a court applies the expressive conduct test under the Speech 
Clause, for example, and the plaintiffs fail to show intent to convey a 
particular message, there can be no protection.71  If, instead, a journalist 
videorecords police, the Speech Clause and its test for expression do not 
apply.72  Rather, the question, if there is one, becomes whether the 
journalist was engaged in newsgathering.73  Of the courts that have found 
First Amendment protection for videorecording police, some have 
recognized the activity as expressive conduct, some as a blend of Speech 
Clause and Press Clause protections, and others on a basis that is 
unclear.74 
1. Antecedents to speech 
The first to recognize a First Amendment right to videorecord police 
was the Eleventh Circuit, which found First Amendment protection to 
film “matters of public interest” on public property.75  The court’s 
holding rested on its earlier recognition of a right to videorecord public 
meetings and matters of public interest.76  In other words the holding 
rested on the right to gather information to enable speech.77  The court 
found that a right to videorecord police officers performing their duties 
on public property fit within the previously protected rights to gather 
information through access to public places and proceedings.78 
The Eleventh Circuit did not state which clause of the First 
Amendment its holding was based on.79  But it cited to cases finding 
protection for members of the public in similar situations under the 
Speech Clause and finding protection for journalists in similar situations 
under the Press Clause.80  In two parentheticals, the court explained that 
the press and the public have similar rights to information, but it did not 
clearly draw a connection between the act of videorecording police and 
                                                          
 71.   See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2016), rev’d, 
862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 72.   Clay Calvert, The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent, 
Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 230, 250–51 (2016). 
 73.   See id. 
 74.   I have been unable to locate any cases that analyzed videorecording police as pure speech. 
 75.   Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Id. 
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the Press Clause.81  Because the court’s only citations to cases of citizens 
videorecording police were to decisions grounded in the Speech Clause 
and because the court made no statement directly connecting 
videorecording police to the Press Clause, the court is best understood to 
analogize the protection for the press to the protection for the public.82  
For the public, gathering information precedes speaking about 
information and therefore under the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, 
videorecording is an antecedent to speech. 
Most recently, in Fields v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit 
found a right to videorecord police when it overturned a flawed Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania opinion.83  The Court held that there is “no 
practical difference between allowing police to prevent people from 
taking recordings and actually banning the possession or distribution of 
them.”84  Preventing citizens from videorecording police is 
unconstitutional because the First Amendment protects access to 
information so that it may be used in public discussion.85  Allowing the 
public to participate in gathering information complements the role of 
journalists.86 
In American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez the Seventh 
Circuit dealt with a related issue when it held that an eavesdropping 
statute was likely unconstitutional.87  There, the plaintiff sought an 
injunction, arguing that a state statute unconstitutionally prevented it 
from videorecording police.88  The court analyzed the act of 
videorecording police as an antecedent to speech, like note taking at a 
public event is an antecedent to publishing an article.89  Just as note 
taking raises First Amendment concerns, the court held that preventing 
the public from videorecording police raises First Amendment 
concerns.90  The court noted that it had “never seriously questioned that 
the processes of writing words on paper, painting a picture, and playing 
                                                          
 81.   Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 29 at 323 (explaining that the court “merely addressed a 
videographer’s First Amendment rights in passing, and failed to precisely derive the source of 
protection from the language of the First Amendment”). 
 82.   Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. 
 83.   862 F.3d 353, 362 (3d. Cir. 2017). See notes 114-120 and accompanying text discussing 
the district court’s decision. 
 84.   Id. at 358. 
 85.   Id. at 359–60. 
 86.   Id. at 360. 
 87.   679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 88.   Id. at 588. 
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an instrument are purely expressive activities entitled to full First 
Amendment protection.”91  Restricting a medium of expression, the court 
found, was tantamount to restricting the expression itself.92  Therefore, 
the court concluded restricting videography was restricting speech and 
was likely unconstitutional.93  The ACLU’s clear intent to publish its 
recordings94 likely bolstered the court’s finding of protection.  If instead, 
there had been no clear intent to publish, the court may not have been 
willing to assume the act of videorecording police was an antecedent to 
publication. 
2. Expressive Conduct 
In Robinson v. Fetterman, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held 
that the First Amendment protected the plaintiff’s right to videorecord 
police, regardless of whether he had any reason for videorecording 
police.95  At first glance, this suggests that the court did not analyze 
Robinson’s rights under the expressive conduct test because the first 
prong of that test requires a message to convey.  Without any reason to 
videorecord police, Robinson could not have a message to convey and 
would fail the test.96 
However, the court went on to list the plaintiff’s reasons for 
videorecording police.  He was recording activity that he believed to be 
unsafe and he had previously spoken to a state representative about his 
safety concerns.97  The court noted that the plaintiff had a First 
Amendment right to express those safety concerns through speech or 
conduct.98  The court also noted that videorecording police can be useful 
in gathering information, including evidence of certain problems or 
concerns, to be disseminated to the public.99  So, though the court may 
not have explicitly considered whether Robinson had a message to 
convey, intent did play a role in the court’s finding of protection.  If 
Robinson were exercising pure speech, the reasons for his speech would 
be irrelevant.  Similarly, there would be no need for reasons or intent if 
                                                          
 91.   Id. at 596. 
 92.   Id. at 600. 
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 94.   Id. at 588. 
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the conduct were so intertwined as to be considered speech.  For the 
court’s analysis to make sense, it must be that Robinson’s actions were 
expressive conduct.  The court’s inclusion of the plaintiff’s reasons for 
speaking while the court dismissed the importance of those reasons 
illustrates the way analysis of the right to videorecord police under the 
Speech Clause becomes jumbled. 
In Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, the District of New 
Jersey focused on the requirement for an intended message when it 
analyzed the question of protection for a plaintiff who photographed a 
police officer.100  The court afforded First Amendment protection 
because the plaintiff showed that the photographs were linked to her 
political activism.101  The court specifically limited the protection to 
expressive or communicative photography.102  This indicates that the 
court viewed the videorecording as expressive conduct rather than pure 
speech and that the holding was limited to protection for expressive 
conduct. 
In Pluma v. City of New York, the Southern District of New York 
found no clearly established protection for a “citizen journalist” who did 
not show intent to disseminate the video he took of Occupy Wall Street 
protests.103  Because the plaintiff did not have a message to convey, his 
claim failed the first prong of the expressive conduct test.104  The court’s 
specific reference to the fact that the plaintiff was a “citizen journalist” 
suggests that the outcome may have been different if the videographer 
were a professional journalist.105  In fact, another Southern District of 
New York judge later stated in Higginbotham v. City of New York that 
the Pluma analysis would not apply to a professional journalist filming a 
newsworthy event for broadcast.106  Higginbotham departs from Pluma 
in its acknowledgement that videography can be “an essential step 
towards an expressive activity,”107 not merely expressive conduct.  This 
signals that the Southern District of New York might consider protection 
for videorecording police if the act is framed as an antecedent to speech.  
However, the court limited the statement to professional journalists who 
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intend to publish.108  It is unclear whether the court would extend the 
same protection to the public. 
In Gilles v. Davis, the Third Circuit said in a footnote that there 
“may” be a right to videorecord police performing their duties on public 
property, but did not answer the question.109  At the same time, the court 
said “photography or videography that has a communicative or 
expressive purpose enjoys some First Amendment protection.”110  In 
support of this statement the court cited to three cases finding First 
Amendment protection for expressive conduct.111  It appears that by 
requiring an expressive or communicative purpose, the court means to 
apply the first prong of the expressive conduct test, which requires the 
speaker have a message to convey.112  The Court’s limited analysis of the 
right to video record police had a significant impact on analysis of the 
question within the circuit. 
Because Gilles’ precedent was limited and unclear, five years later in 
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle the Third Circuit held that a right to 
videorecord police was not clearly established.113  The defendant in Kelly 
argued that there was no clearly established “right to surreptitiously 
videotape a police officer without an expressive or communicative 
purpose.”114  In other words, he argued that the plaintiff could not satisfy 
the elements of the expressive conduct test.  Rigid adherence to this 
expressive conduct framework likely slowed progress in the right to 
videorecord police in the circuit because it prevented courts from 
considering other type of speech that might apply. 
The next noteworthy case, Fields v. City of Philadelphia was 
recently reversed by the Third Circuit, it is nevertheless worth discussion 
because it provides an example of the problems that may arise when 
courts attempt to apply the expressive conduct test to video recording 
police.115  In Fields, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found no First 
Amendment protection for a plaintiff who took photos of a police 
gathering from a public sidewalk or another plaintiff who took video of 
police arresting a protestor.116  The court reached its conclusion by 
                                                          
 108.   Id. at 378–79. 
 109.   Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 110.   Id.  
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focusing on whether the plaintiffs’ conduct was sufficiently expressive to 
be protected.117  The court however went beyond the requirement that an 
actor have “an intent to convey a particularized message.”118  The court 
required a critical message.119 
This requirement of a critical message may explain why the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania afforded Robinson protection when it did not 
afford Fields and his co-plaintiff in the consolidated action protection.  In 
Robinson, there was evidence that the plaintiff intended to be critical and 
that the audience would understand that critical message.  Robinson had 
voiced his concerns about unsafe procedures to his state representative 
and police were aware of his concerns because they had arrested him 
previously for videorecording the same activities.120  At the district court 
level in Fields, the plaintiffs could not show that the conduct itself was 
expressive, let alone critical of police.121  Therefore, this requirement for 
a critical message made it impossible for the plaintiffs to prevail.122  
There is also an indication that the district court would have treated 
journalists differently.  The district court specifically noted that the 
plaintiffs were not members of the press while analyzing the plaintiffs’ 
expressive behavior.123  This suggests that the court may have asked 
different questions if the plaintiffs had been journalists.  Perhaps the 
court would have presumed journalists intended to convey a message. 
3. The Press Clause 
In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit analyzed the public right to 
videorecord police through the lens of First Amendment protection for 
“conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information.”124  
The First Circuit did not state under which clause or type of speech it 
analyzed this question,125  but the court did emphasize the First 
Amendment purpose of allowing access to information to promote 
discussion of government.126  An opinion flowing from this purpose 
could be read under the Speech Clause, in which case the Court 
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analogized videorecording police to other antecedents to speech and 
protected videorecording police as an antecedent to speech.  On the other 
hand, the opinion could be read under the Press Clause, in which case the 
court determined that the protection for newsgathering extends to the 
general public as well as to the press. 
A close look indicates that the court was extending Press Clause 
protection to the public. The court noted that the press and the public 
share the same rights of access to information127 and that “[t]he First 
Amendment right to gather news” applies to both the press and the 
public.128 The First Circuit’s analysis indicates that its intention was to 
extend Press Clause protection beyond the news industry to any person 
gathering “news.”129  First, the court cited cases affording protection to 
journalists videorecording or photographing police to support protection 
for the public.130  Second, the court mentioned the difficulty in drawing 
the line between journalist and citizen when both have the technological 
means to gather and widely share information.131  And third, the court 
noted that bystanders may be just as likely to take images of current 
events as journalists.132  Though the analysis could be read to protect 
videorecording as an antecedent to speech, for the reasons listed above, it 
is more likely that the court was applying the Press Clause.133 
In Garcia v. Montgomery County, the District of Maryland drew on 
Supreme Court precedent to find that the public has a right to record 
police officers in the performance of their duties.134  The court focused 
on the Supreme Court’s statement in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., that 
“[t]here is an undoubted [First Amendment] right to gather news ‘from 
any source by means within the law.’”135  The court then noted that the 
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Supreme Court has found “the free discussion of governmental affairs” 
important to the First Amendment.136  Together, these Supreme Court 
cases led the court to the conclusion that First Amendment protection 
exists for recording government actions that may become newsworthy, 
whether or not they are newsworthy at the moment they are recorded.137  
Here again it is unclear whether the court is relying on the Press Clause 
or the Speech Clause in its analysis.  Like Glik, Garcia could be read as 
an acknowledgement that the public has rights under the Press Clause or 
as an analogy of public information gathering to journalist 
newsgathering.  Because of the mention of newsworthiness and 
Houchins, Garcia is best understood as Press Clause protection for the 
public. 
D.  Analysis of Journalists Under the First Amendment 
The analysis of First Amendment protection for journalists is much 
simpler.  Because “the press” has come to mean the news industry, 
application of the Press Clause is all but automatic.  In some instances, 
courts may technically require that journalists have intent to publish the 
videos they record before granting First Amendment protection, but in 
practice courts presume journalists intend to publish those videos.138 
The deepest discussions of intent to publish occur in reporter’s 
privilege cases.  In those cases, some circuits have held that intent to 
disseminate information in the public interest is a prerequisite to the 
reporter’s privilege.139  But analysis of intent only occurs when the 
person claiming the privilege is not a journalist.140  When the person 
claiming the privilege is a journalist, the intent requirement is never even 
considered or applied to the facts—it is apparently presumed to be 
satisfied.141 
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At the heart of these Press Clause cases is a nexus between the public 
interest and the act of newsgathering.142  Protection is afforded to 
activities that promote access to information that can be published as 
news. Therefore, protection is granted for keeping sources confidential, 
in gathering information for stories, or in videorecording police. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Building on the concepts established in Part II, this section will show 
that the right to videorecord police is best analyzed as an antecedent to 
speech under the Speech Clause or as newsgathering under the Press 
Clause. Next, this section will show that affording citizens who 
videorecord police a presumption of intent to publish best focuses the 
analysis and best serves the purpose of both the press and Speech Clause.  
Finally, this section discusses the numerous reasons the Supreme Court 
should address this issue at its earliest opportunity. 
A. Purpose and Meaning of the First Amendment 
As the Supreme Court has noted, the purpose of the First 
Amendment is to allow the sharing of information in the public 
interest.143  In recent years, as criticism of certain police practices has 
grown, so has interest in how the police perform their duties.  Video of 
police officers at work is of interest to the public because it allows the 
public to see how police officers perform their duties, especially when 
interacting with the public.144  A video record also gives individuals and 
the public a better ability to address situations where the police officer 
and a citizen tell conflicting stories about a sequence of events.  This 
access to a third source of evidence prevents abuses of power that could 
occur if the government were permitted to hold a monopoly on 
information.145  Furthermore, protecting public videorecording of police 
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gives the public a better idea of whether there is a problem with police 
procedures and, if so, how big that problem is. 
A presumption that citizens intend to publish videos of police serves 
the purpose of public discussion because citizens who videorecord police 
are likely to publish the video.  An age of mass information sharing 
indicates that a person is unlikely to take video of a controversial topic 
and never share it.  They may turn the video over to a news station for 
publication on television or the Internet.  They may share the video on 
social media.  They may show it to friends.  If citizens are not protected 
in the initial act of videorecording police, they are prevented from all of 
these later publications.146  The public might then be deprived of 
important images, such as the citizen videography of the beating of 
Rodney King, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, or the 
police shootings of black men today.147  It is exactly this sort of 
deprivation that the First Amendment was intended to prevent. 
B. The Best Avenues for Analyzing Videorecording of Police 
The way courts frame the analysis of First Amendment protection for 
videorecording police plays a major role in determining whether there is 
First Amendment protection. Courts should be wary of inadvertently 
putting the cart before the horse by focusing their analysis on one type of 
protected expression before determining if that type of expression suits 
the act of videorecording police.  The right to videorecord police can be 
properly assessed under either the antecedent-to-speech test or the press 
clause analysis.  Both approaches keep the court focused on the act of 
videorecording police in its truest sense—in which it is inextricably tied 
to information in the public interest.  Each of the other speech analyses 
prove inapt. 
1. Pure Speech and Expressive Conduct 
Attempts to analyze videorecording police as pure speech are 
misguided because the analysis of speech is not intended to protect 
activity like videorecording police.  Pure speech is meant to protect 
“inherently expressive” activity.148  The act of videorecording is not 
inherently expressive.  It does not evoke thoughts or feelings.  It is not in 
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itself alone expressive of anything.  It would more aptly be called 
conduct than speech. 
The expressive conduct analysis is even more ill-suited to analyze 
videorecording of police.  Expressive conduct is conduct “sufficiently 
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope” of First 
Amendment protection.149  Conduct can only be considered expressive if 
it (1) carries an intent to convey a message in itself and (2) people who 
view the conduct would be able to understand the message.150  As some 
courts have noted, videorecording police is inconsistent with expressive 
conduct.151  People who videorecord police may have an intent to convey 
a message that people would understand, but that intent and message are 
found in the video and the plans to publish the video, not in the act of 
videorecording itself.  When courts attempt to fit videorecording police 
into expressive conduct, they are likely to inadvertently favor a message 
of criticism because it is easier for an audience to understand a message 
of criticism.  If police conduct in a given situation is questionable, the 
police and other bystanders are likely to understand that act of 
videorecording as critical.  On the other hand, if police conduct appears 
generic, the audience is likely to have more trouble interpreting the 
message—it could be critical, it could be praise, or there could be no 
message whatsoever.  This favoring of one message over another is itself 
a First Amendment violation152 and should not be permitted to play a part 
in the analysis of First Amendment protection. 
Videorecording fails pure speech and expressive conduct tests 
because those tests were never meant to apply to activities like 
videorecording police.  The antecedent to speech and newsgathering 
protection, on the other hand, were meant to protect precisely this type of 
activity. 
2. Antecedents to Speech 
The rationale for protecting antecedents to speech under the Speech 
Clause is that the antecedent is so intertwined with the speech itself that 
it is a part of the speech and therefore should be protected just as the 
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speech is protected.153  Just as an essay cannot be published unless it is 
written, a video cannot be shared unless it is recorded.154  To “disconnect 
the end product from the act of creation” is inappropriate155 because 
without the freedom to record the video, the video cannot be published.  
This analysis properly considers the issue through the lens of the purpose 
to protect speech. 
Some courts that use the antecedent-to-speech analysis draw an 
analogy to the press’s right to gather news.156  This analogy is supported 
by the fact that the public has the same right to access information as the 
press.157  So just as the press is protected in gathering information for 
publication, the public is protected in gathering information for speech.  
This analysis is also proper because it considers the broader First 
Amendment purpose to protect the forum for discussion of issues in the 
public interest.158 
One risk of the antecedent-to-speech approach is that it could be easy 
for courts to slide from that analysis into expressive conduct.  Robinson 
v. Fetterman provides an example of this problem.  The opinion appears 
to begin as an antecedent to speech analysis.  The court mentioned that 
the public has a right to express concerns and that there is an important 
public interest in gathering information.159  The court also said that the 
plaintiff was not required to show any reason for videorecording police; 
in other words, he need not have a message to convey.160  Next the court 
should have considered whether the plaintiff’s conduct was so 
intertwined with speech itself that it should be protected as speech.  But 
instead, even though it had just stated that the reasons the plaintiff had 
for videorecording police were unnecessary to the discussion,161 the court 
went on to discuss those reasons.  Because the court ignored the issues 
important to determining protection for antecedents to speech, but 
discussed the issues important to expressive conduct, the court turned an 
antecedent-to-speech analysis into an expressive-conduct analysis, 
seemingly without even realizing it was doing so. 
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The risk of sliding into expressive conduct can be mitigated.  A clear 
indication from the Supreme Court would make this jumbled analysis 
unlikely to reoccur.  Additionally, as further explained infra, the risk that 
a court will engage in this faulty analysis is mitigated by a presumption 
that the public intends to publish videorecordings of police.  If courts 
start with this presumption, it becomes clear that the case is really about 
antecedents to publication, not about expressive conduct. 
Another risk of the antecedent-to-speech approach is that a court 
may require citizens to show a clear intent to publish the video.  Without 
such an intent, the court may feel it is being asked to recognize an 
antecedent to non-existent future speech.  Part of the reason for requiring 
a citizen to prove intent is overemphasis on the idea that the protected 
activity is an “antecedent” to speech.  The idea behind the protection for 
antecedents to speech is that actions leading up to speech are protected in 
order to preserve the speech itself.  Overemphasis on the word 
“antecedent,” instead of the rationale that the action is intertwined with 
speech leads to the error of requiring intent to publish when courts 
should be protecting the ability to publish.  Courts should take care to 
consider the meaning of the word “antecedent” within the framework of 
protecting the forum for discussion of matters in the public interest. 
3.  The Press Clause 
Courts could also effectively analyze the First Amendment 
protection for videorecording police as a protected activity under the 
Press Clause.162  The Press Clause protects the right to gather information 
because information is essential to the freedom to publish.163  The Press 
Clause therefore protects publication by protecting the right to gather 
information. 
When the industrialized press is stopped from lawfully gathering 
information, a First Amendment violation occurs.164  There is no need for 
a particular message to be conveyed by the gathering of information and 
there is no need for the act of gathering information to be intrinsically 
expressive.165  Instead, the information gathering is protected in order to 
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protect publication.  Because the Press Clause was intended to protect all 
publication, rather from journalists or the public, it is appropriate to 
analyze videorecording police under the Press Clause. 
C. The Presumption and Its Application Under Each Clause 
The presumption is necessary to ensure that the press is not favored 
over the public.  Even if videorecording police is properly analyzed as an 
antecedent to speech or as newsgathering, First Amendment protection 
may not be afforded because of the difference in the way courts treat the 
press and the public.  When citizens are required to show intent but 
journalists are not, the bar for protection of citizens who videorecord 
police is raised above the bar required for the protection of professional 
journalists who videorecord police.166  Just as it is reasonable to presume 
that journalists intend to publish their stories, it is reasonable to presume 
that citizens who videorecord police intend to publish those videos. 
A presumption of intent to publish is reasonable because police 
activities are currently of heightened interest to the public.167  If a citizen 
sees police activity and records it, he is likely to share it because he is 
likely aware of the popularity of previous recordings.  Furthermore, he 
need not share the video on television for the act of sharing to properly 
be called publishing because sharing within a small circle is 
publishing.168  Thus, sharing the video with friends on social media is 
publishing. 
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There may have once been an argument for a slight difference in 
press and public protection, but it does not exist today.  Nearly 40 years 
ago, Justice Stewart argued that the “concept of equal access must be 
accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical 
distinctions between the press and the general public.”169  But 40 years 
ago smart phones were decades from being invented.  At that time, there 
were major differences in journalists’ and the public’s ability to capture 
and disseminate information.  Because the purpose of journalists is to be 
agents of the public who gather and share information with the public,170 
the public interest was served by granting journalists greater flexibility 
than the public. 
Today, information in the public interest is just as likely to originate 
with an average citizen and her cell phone as it is a professional 
journalist.  There is no need to afford greater flexibility to the press as a 
representative of the public when members of the public can represent 
their interests themselves.171  As news organizations cut staff and spread 
efforts between paper and electronic media, citizen journalists play an 
important role in the free flow of information.172 
The presumption of intent to publish focuses the analysis of the right 
to videorecord police and could keep courts from straying into 
considering types of speech that are ill-suited to the issue.  When the 
public is presumed to intend to publish videos of police, it becomes clear 
that the act of videorecording police is an effort to gather information.  It 
then becomes clear that information is inextricably intertwined with the 
ability to publish.  It also becomes clear that pure speech is not the 
proper avenue for analyzing this issue because intent is not at issue in 
pure speech.  The presumption would also lead courts closer to finding 
that the expressive conduct test is satisfied.  With an intent to publish, an 
intent to convey a particular message is only a step or two away.  The 
presumption would help courts and litigants focus on the correct intent 
question and thereby recognize that it is the end product, not the act of 
videorecording that is meant to be expressive. 
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The presumption should be rebuttable to ensure that First 
Amendment protection is appropriate.  A videographer would be 
assumed to have intent to publish videorecordings of police unless or 
until the opposing party showed that the videographer did not intend to 
publish the videorecordings.  A model rebuttable presumption already 
exists in the First Amendment context in the presumption that criminal 
trials are open to the public.173  This presumption may be overcome with 
“findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether” 
the presumption was properly overcome.174  Similarly, the rebuttable 
presumption of intent to publish videos of police could be overcome by 
specific findings that show the videographer did not intend to publish the 
video.  If, for instance, the videographer herself said at the time of the 
videography that she intended to keep the video for herself alone, the 
opposing party would be able to use that statement, absent other contrary 
evidence, to successfully rebut the presumption. 
At its next opportunity, the Supreme Court should hear a case on the 
First Amendment right to videorecord police.  The Court should clarify 
this area of the law by analyzing the activity as an antecedent to speech 
or as newsgathering and by adopting a rebuttable presumption that 
citizens intend to publish videos of police. 
D.  Why the Status Quo Must Change 
Some might argue that the Supreme Court need not address this issue 
because the circuit courts have found protection for the right to 
videorecord police.  On the contrary, the Court should address this issue 
because the circuits are struggling to properly characterize and analyze 
the act of videorecording police.  Many lower courts have analyzed the 
issue in ways that defy the Court’s precedent holding that the press and 
public should be treated equally.  Some consider facts that are not 
relevant to the stated type of expression.  The cases analyzed in Part II.C 
illustrate the current confusion in this area of law.  The courts vary 
widely in their approaches to the issue.  Though the First, Third, Fifth, 
and Eleventh circuits have acknowledged a right to videorecord police, 
the basis of their findings is not uniform.  The First Circuit found a right 
to videorecord police based on the right to gather information.175  The 
Seventh Circuit held that a statute interfering with the right to 
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videorecord police implicated the same concerns as interfering with 
traditional antecedents to speech.176  The Eleventh Circuit based its 
holding on recognizing videorecording police as an antecedent to speech, 
similar to the way newsgathering could be seen as an antecedent to 
publication.177  This variation leaves lower courts, particularly in circuits 
that have not addressed the question, without a clear path to follow. 
A uniform framework would better serve courts, police officers, and 
the public by providing clear rules and expectations.  This framework 
should respect precedent, avoid distinctions between the press and the 
public, and protect the public interest. 
1.  Respecting Supreme Court Precedent 
A long line of Supreme Court cases hold that journalists are not 
afforded greater rights to information than the public.178  “[T]he First 
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special 
access to information not available to the public generally.”179  Courts 
violate this principle of equal treatment when they presume journalists 
intend to publish their videos but fail to presume the same intent for 
citizens. 
In its decisions, the Supreme Court typically considers the purpose of 
the First Amendment.  That purpose supports equal treatment.  Many 
Supreme Court decisions note that the First Amendment was intended to 
“protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”180 The press may 
contribute to the discussion of government affairs on its own, but 
protection for a public right to videorecord police increases the amount 
of information available for public discussion.  Equal treatment therefore 
aligns with the purpose of the First Amendment. 
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2.  The Problem with Defining the Press 
Without a clear framework, unequal treatment of journalists and 
citizens is likely to continue and with that unequal treatment comes the 
difficult question of who is a journalist for the purpose of First 
Amendment protections.  Basing a definition for the press on a person’s 
status as a journalist realizes one of the fears that prompted the creation 
of the Press Clause in the first place.181  Defining the press is likely to 
lead to an attempt to distinguish between types of content that are 
“newsworthy” and types that are not.  It might also lead to distinguishing 
the press based on ownership of the means of publication.  Both these 
methods of distinguishing press and citizens are contrary to the Court’s 
precedent.182 
Law student Camille Higham argues persuasively that instead of 
defining press by professional standards, the press should be defined by 
activity as “any person who engages in newsgathering.”183  That way 
anyone gathering news would be protected as a member of the press, 
whether that person is a part of the news industry or not.184  While this 
approach does broaden the protection, it does not go far enough because 
it could be interpreted to require defining “news,” and therefore could 
lead to content-based qualifications for the classification of news.  If 
protection were only afforded to those gathering what is deemed “real 
news,” the result would be discrimination on the basis of content, which 
is unconstitutional.185  This concern is heightened in the wake of 
politically charged claims of “fake news.”186 
Some have argued that the press should be treated differently from 
ordinary citizens because ordinary citizens may not hold themselves to 
the same standards as professional journalists.187  But this concern is a 
red herring because both members of the press and ordinary citizens are 
held accountable for breaking the law, whether they are engaged in 
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gathering news or not.188  Recognizing First Amendment protection for 
citizens who videorecord police does not give those citizens the right to 
break into the police department and hide a camera or interfere with a 
police investigation any more than the same protection would allow 
journalists to do so.  Case law is clear that the protection of the First 
Amendment does not shield those protected from generally applicable 
laws.189  This concern about professionalism does not outweigh the 
public policy considerations favoring equal treatment. 
3.  Public Policy Implications 
First Amendment protection for videorecording police would serve 
the current public interest.  Early writers believed it was important to be 
aware of the government’s actions in order to develop opinions about 
those actions and vote accordingly.190  “[T]o enable every citizen at any 
time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of 
public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of 
the authority which the people have conferred upon them” was the 
purpose of the freedom of speech and press.191  Over the last twenty 
years, public confidence in police actions has decreased.192  The last few 
years especially have seen increased criticism of police and calls for 
changes in training.193  Videos of police conduct inform this 
discussion.194  They allow citizens and officials alike to discuss police 
conduct in real world situations.195  These videos also provide valuable 
evidence, which could benefit the police’s ability to charge citizens with 
crimes, the public’s ability to protect their rights and the police’s ability 
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to defend their actions.196  Protecting the efforts of citizens and the press 
alike to videorecord police officers “preserve[s] and facilitate[s] modern 
flows of quality information.”197 
Public videorecordings of police also serve the First Amendment 
purpose of providing a fourth check on the powers of government.198  
Journalists simply cannot be in as many locations at once as the rest of 
the public can.  Additionally, the news media’s ability to gather news is 
challenged by decreasing resources in the face of “pressure from online 
competition.”199  “The press” has shrunk in response to changes in 
technology and the economy.200  Because modern journalists face 
shrinking resources, they are ever more likely to rely on the contributions 
of citizens to complete their coverage.201  The public should be allowed 
to step in to assist the press in its function as the fourth check on the 
powers of the government. 
Without the right to videorecord police, complaints about police 
conduct and procedure become a “he said, she said” guessing game 
where the police have the upper hand.  First, juries and judges may be 
more likely to believe police officers than private citizens.202  Second, 
without a public right to videorecord police, the police have the ability to 
control whether interactions are recorded.203  The police can choose to 
use their dash cams or body cams.  Several studies, including one by the 
Department of Justice,204 have found that police officers are inconsistent 
in their use of cameras, tamper with cameras, and fail to turn cameras on 
when they use force.205  Even when police do use their cameras to record 
interactions, the fact that police recordings are the only record poses a 
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problem for the interests of justice.  People are more likely to sympathize 
with the perspective of the videographer than the perspective of the 
opposite party in an interaction.206  Therefore a jury, which may already 
be more likely to believe police, is put in the position of sympathizing 
with the police.  This imbalance in a matter of public interest is precisely 
the type of problem the First Amendment was intended to protect 
against. 
E.  Constitutionally Permissible Restrictions on the Right to 
Videorecord Police 
Though the Supreme Court should act to clarify this area of law and 
recognize protection for citizens who videorecord police, this does not 
mean that the Court should recognize the right without limits.  All First 
Amendment rights are subject to some restrictions: 
“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided 
the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.’”207 
The First Circuit acknowledged that reasonable time, place and 
manner restrictions may be placed on citizens videorecording police.208  
In a later case, the court provided examples of indirect and direct 
restrictions that would be reasonable.209  The court held it would be 
reasonable for an officer to order bystanders to disperse because of safety 
concerns, even though that order would indirectly affect the public’s 
ability to record police.210  It would also be reasonable for an officer to 
directly order a person to stop videotaping if the officer reasonably 
believed the videotaping was interfering with his work.211  But the 
reasonableness of the officer’s belief is analyzed from the perspective 
that officers must endure the burdens of citizens exercising their 
constitutional rights.212  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that 
officers may not order a person away “because he is recording, [but] may 
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order bystanders to disperse for reasons related to public safety and order 
and other legitimate law-enforcement needs.”213 
The Supreme Court should take a similar approach.  The Bill of 
Rights is a balancing act of private freedoms and government interests.  
While constitutional freedoms are essential to the American way of life, 
it is also essential that government officials are able to do their jobs.  The 
First and Seventh Circuits have sensibly balanced these interests by 
recognizing that in some situations the safety and needs of the public are 
better served by stopping the public from recording.  These situations are 
few and should not be the driving force behind the rule.  If the Court is 
faced with a case in which it was reasonable to limit a citizen’s ability to 
videorecord police, the Court should frame that reasonable limit as an 
exception to the rule that the First Amendment protects the right to 
videorecord police. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the First Amendment is well known and universally 
accepted—the framers wanted to protect the forum for discussion of 
matters in the public interest and provide a check on government abuses.  
Both the speech and press clause protect the right to videorecord police.  
The speech clause protects antecedents to speech because they are 
intertwined with the ability to speak.  Historical analysis, coupled with 
application of the First Amendment’s general purpose, shows that the 
Press Clause protects not only journalists, but all who publish ideas.  In 
accordance with the First Amendment, protection must be given to all 
who videorecord police. 
The Supreme Court has developed tests to protect the various types 
of action that the Speech and Press Clauses protect.  If applied 
inappropriately, these tests can deny the protections they were meant to 
safeguard.  The debate about the right to videorecord police is a perfect 
example of this problem.  Confusion about which test to apply when 
citizens videorecord police has led to confusion about whether the First 
Amendment protects a right to videotape police at all. 
Courts can and should rigorously protect the public’s right to 
videorecord police by adopting a rule that presumes the public intends to 
publish and analyzes the issue as an antecedent to speech under the 
speech clause or as newsgathering under the press clause.  The right to 
videorecord police should not be granted just to members of the 
                                                          
 213.   ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012). 
180 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
industrialized press, but to anyone who might happen upon a 
questionable police encounter, just as Feidin Santana did.214  Affording a 
presumption of intent to publish will protect the ability of passersby to 
capture important events and further important discussions.  As society 
wrestles with how to respond to police shootings, video of the event can 
only aid in that discussion and therefore serve the purpose of the First 
Amendment. 
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